will be the relation between these two ways of 'positing values': how-if at all-does his naturalistic study of them guide and support the values he himself proposes?
Nietzsche's idea of values is further complicated by the way his naturalism leads to a certain critique of the very faculty of reflecting on, choosing, and abiding by values, which it is the point of ethics to develop and improve in us. He questions whether we have such a faculty, and whether (if we do) it's in fact desirable. This critique is often interpreted as bearing especially against 'free will'. But I think it's much broader than this; it attacks our confidence in our agency, and in our 'agential' way of valuing. It calls into question the importance and value of what we usually call 'valuing', the kind of values we're aware of and put into words. I'll argue that this attack, though not meant to be fatal, points a lesson to change how agency and its values work in us-their role in our personal economy.
After talking first about life, then about values, I'll turn finally to the question how the former are used to correct/guide the latter. Nietzsche faces three challenges here, and we must see how he meets them. First, he must give reasons or arguments for appealing to life-justifications of its authority to correct our values. Second he must extract from life some determinate criterion to serve as a standard to revalue values. And third he must show that this criterion can actually be used to generate new values we might plausibly practice.
There is a large philosophical difficulty in meeting these challenges. In extracting from life a 'criterion' for revaluing values, Nietzsche is extracting a value-a value offered as authoritative for revising other values. But any argument from life to such a value seems to (try to) derive a value from a fact, which is often taken as an outright mistake. How, from the premise that life is so and so, could any valuative conclusions follow as to how we should be? We must study Nietzsche's prospects for using life to support his values in a way that can deflect this obvious retort.
Before looking at some passages, I want to offer a very quick partition of some senses in which Nietzsche (or anyone) might use 'life'. 5 We will hold these options in mind when we look at the passages. Which of the following-or which combination of biological and other senses. We must see how to connect the argumentative and affective uses of the term.
Passages and issues.
Let's start though with Nietzsche's most poetic and dramatic treatments of life, his personifications of her in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. What these mean, and also whether they mean some point about life we can formulate, will be ultimate issues for us.
These passages open up another dimension of problems for us, and give us a fuller sense of Nietzsche's topic of life. Is there any argument in (or behind) this drama with 'Life'?
In which of the above senses is life here represented?
The Note here the image of depth, of life as an encompassing medium one sinks down into, towards no bottom, no place to find ground. This lack of ground is epistemic: we can't find the explanation or truth about life, we can't see to the bottom of it. We can't see to the bottom, above all, of what it's for, of its purpose or meaning. (To life in which sense do these thoughts apply?) Notice also that Life implies that she has a ground, even if people can't find it.
6
'The Dance-Song' then introduces a second female, his 'wild Wisdom', and depicts the two of them jealous over him. Zarathustra sums the situation: 'Thus it stands, then, among us three. From the ground up I love only Life -and verily, most of all when I hate her! / But that I am good to Wisdom and often too good: that is because she reminds me so much of Life!' Zarathustra's love for life belongs to a great host of passages in which Nietzsche promotes 'saying Yes to life'; we'll examine these later. Notice here how the idea of ground [Grund] returns, in Zarathustra's striking statement that he loves only life 'from the ground up'. Now is this life's ground, or Zarathustra's? If he loves life from its own ground up, this would seem to mean loving it as it is, and hence knowing what it is-and knowing in particular what it's for, its ground as its purpose or meaning. So does Zarathustra think he has fathomed it after all? Or is it rather that he loves life 'from the bottom of himself', i.e. wholeheartedly?
We should also remark the competition between his love for/by life, with that for/by wisdom. As his two loves they represent Zarathustra's (and Nietzsche's) ultimate ends. The second, 'wisdom', is ambiguous: does it refer to Zarathustra's effort at truth, i.e. his will to truth, or to his achievement of it (the truth he knows)? In any case this attachment to truth stands in tension with his love of life, even though he cares about truth because it reminds him of life. We'll examine this conflict between life and truth.
Life as persona reappears soon in ii.12 'On Self-Overcoming', to which I'll return.
But let's jump first to iii.15, 'The Other Dance-Song', where Zarathustra's romance with life is resumed, again in a song sung by Zarathustra's soul to Life: '"Into your eye I looked lately, O Life: gold I saw in your night-eye glinting, -my heart stood still from this delight: / "-a golden boat I saw glinting on nocturnal waters: a sinking, drinking, ever-winking golden rocking-boat!"' Note that life is again depicted as a sea. Now there's a boat, but a 'sinking' boat that doesn't keep one out of life's depths. This is presumably the boat of Dionysus, bringing the new ideal.
After the song there is a conversation between Zarathustra and Life, in which she tells him: '"And even if we do not love each other from the ground up -, must one then be cross, because one does not love from the ground up? / "And that I am good to you and often too good, that you know: and the reason [Grund] is that I am jealous of your Wisdom. Ah, that crazy old madwoman Wisdom! / "If your Wisdom should ever desert you, ah! then my love too would desert you just as swiftly." -'
The idea of 'loving from the ground up' returns, with the same ambiguity (whose ground?) we noted. Life doubts that they so love one another, but seems to reject that requirement. Is it full insight, or full devotion, that's not required? And she says that she is 'good' to him from jealousy of his wisdom, which is indeed all that sustains her love of him. Once again: in which of the above senses of 'life' might it make sense to think that love for it is in this kind of conflict with love of truth?
There then follows the climax of the book, rich with significance: 'Thereupon Life looked pensively behind her and about her and said softly: "O Zarathustra, you are not true enough to me! / "You have long not loved me as much as you say you do; I know you are thinking that you will to leave me soon. . . . / "Yes," I answered hesitantly, "but you also know that -" And I said something into her ear, right through her tangled Now I've skipped over one important section in Zarathustra using this personification of life: ii.12 ('On Self-Overcoming'). It has a somewhat different 7 See the illuminating account of the drama of Z in Lampert 1986. character than the others. For here Nietzsche explicitly relates the character Life to a discussion of the (kind of) life that is being personified. He partly does this by having Life describe herself. Hence he offers much more content about life than in the other personifications. The content he announces, of course, is that life is will to power.
Notice that Zarathustra first seems to derive the point from third-personal observation: 'Where I found the living, there I found will to power; and even in the will of one who serves I found a will to be master.' But he then presents this as something told him by Life: 'And this secret did Life herself tell to me. "Behold," she said, "I am that which must always overcome itself. / "Indeed, you call it will to procreate or drive towards an end, towards the higher, farther, more manifold: but all this is one and one secret."'
A bit later Life gives Nietzsche's famous expression: '"He surely missed the truth who shot at it the words 'will to existence [Dasein] ': this will -does not exist! / "For:
what is not cannot will; but what is in existence, how could that still will to exist! / "Only, where Life is, there too is will: though not will to life, but -thus I teach you -will to power! / "Much is valued by the living more highly than life itself; but out of this very valuing there speaks -will to power!" -/ Thus did Life once teach me: and with this, you who are wisest, I go on to solve the riddle of your hearts.' He solves the riddle of their hearts, because he sees their deepest aim, at power.
Life's ends.
Let's now begin to address these two sets of puzzles about Nietzsche's use of 'life': over its abstract role in his justification of his values, and its exotic presentation in a sexual scenario. Since it is the account of life as will to power that gives his most obvious ground for his values, let's begin there. 8 This claim that life is will to power appears to be a biological point, an account of the life of all organisms. Nietzsche purports to uncover life as such scientifically-not of course so much by his own observations of other organisms, as by reflection on the biological literature he read so attentively.
WP641 Still, even if Nietzsche does think of all biological life as willing power in this way, it may seem that this view can't be that important to him, given that his attention is overwhelmingly focused on one particular kind of organism, the human. Isn't all that matters, that he thinks of humans as willing power in this way? So aren't his biological claims about life quite aside from the main point?
But I think it's important to Nietzsche that 'life' also refers to something wider than the human-yet something that is represented and accessible within us. Nietzsche thinks of each human life as opening out into biological life generally.
It is a medium we enter at our own point, but in which we communicate with all the rest.
Here are a few characteristic passages (there are many others like these): WP678 As Nietzsche often thinks of it, these lower strata of life's willing are built into us in our bodies. Here he uses 'body' in a way that distinguishes it from our spirit, from our conscious-linguistic intentionality (our agency). Elsewhere to be sure he emphasises that we are just our bodies, and that spirit is just a fact about the body. So Z.i.4: 'Body am I entirely, and nothing more; and soul is only the name of something of the body.' Still he continues to use 'body' to refer to this subset of the body's capacities, those made not by social history but by a more ancient, pre-human genetic evolution.
Because these deep projects are intentional, they are part of an individual human's stance, and are accessible in a first-personal attitude. It's possible to make explicit, to bring to awareness, the end-directedness in our body. We can notice better than we usually do 'what it's like' to will as these bodily drives do. And I think this is another kind of access Nietzsche thinks he has to the truth that biological (and human) life is will to power. It's not just by those studies of biological works, but also by a kind of in Ecce Homo. But they also occur many places outside that explicit autobiography.
GS324: 'In media vita. No! Life has not disappointed me! From year to year I find it much truer, more desirable and more mysterious, -since the day the great liberator overcame me, the thought that life could be an experiment for the knowledge-seeker.'
Here I believe 'life' refers to his individual life as he has it to live-he shows here his reflection on just how to live it.
It is a part of this individual life that he lives it in this body, that bears as it does many strata of drives-dispositions and projects-laid down in the social and evolutionary past. 'Life' in a biological sense is represented in the deepest layers of this bodily end-directedness; this is something generic, built as well into all the other descendents since its first fixing by selection. We live this personal life, before death, in a body whose biological wills must be given their due, as we so live it. We'll later see how this relation to a personal life is the real center of Nietzsche's own values.
Values: in our bodies and as agents.
Having sorted some of the multiplicity in Nietzsche's idea of 'life', let's now turn b) But Nietzsche also has a second story. This makes agency not only effective but also harmful, by the way it works against the interests in our body. In this light
Nietzsche sees agency as favoring interests foreign to the body. In particular, agency is a 'secret agent' on behalf of society, understood to require a very strong homogeneity and likeness among its members. And we will only be sufficiently homogeneous if we very strongly want to be like one another, want to 'do as one does'. Agency, and its agentvalues, were designed-in the same extended sense in which natural selection designsby pre-historical cultural processes to 'tame' and 'domesticate' the human animal.
Nietzsche tells this story in the famous second Essay of the Genealogy.
Agency is the 'ability to promise', above all the ability to promise to obey the social rules. This involves the capacity to remember the rules in the heat of the moment when drives are engaged-when the urge to take the marketplace fruit is strongest. One becomes conscious of a linguistic formula such as 'don't steal', and this awareness has a promise-to act not by one's immediate drives but by conscious reference to principlesis deeply designed to subordinate us to social rules-to turn us into 'herd animals'.
So the key feature of agent-values-uppermost in Nietzsche's mind-is that they're designed not in my interest ( A. I'll begin by addressing these questions with respect to the biological idea of life, and examining how this idea supports a redesign of our agent-values. This is the way I addressed these questions in Nietzsche's New Darwinism, and I think it is the most obvious way to think of Nietzsche's argument from life to values. But I'll eventually (in B.) suggest that it is crucially incomplete, and that to get the full scope of his point we need to bring in the personal idea of life, and see how it requires us to redesign more than just our agent-values. To afford space for these further ideas-which will let us address those 'poetic' treatments of life in Zarathustra-I will have to present this very rich first argument very compactly. Even herd morality develops as a means to power-but it's the power of the social group. Selection favors societies that best subordinate members into an effective large group. It is because they favor the power of the group, that agent-values are settled as they are. Moreover, we should notice that it is in each case a particular group, a group organized on behalf of a particular kind of person. So Nietzsche's famous story about master and slave moralities describes how these two systems of agent-values express the interests (and will to power) of two different kinds and sets of individuals. It may often be that agent-values favor the power of a very different kind of person than myself.
Hence seeing life's essence as will to power reveals the underlying end, which all others were adopted as means to-though the latter's status as means has been missed or forgotten. Nietzsche puts the point so: 'Humanity has always repeated the same mistake:
it has made a means to life into a standard of life / : so that instead of finding the measure in the highest enhancement of life itself, . . . it has used the means to a quite particular life to the exclusion of other forms of life, in short for the critique and selection of life / : i.e.
the human finally loves the means for their own sake and forgets they are means: so that they enter his consciousness as goals, as standards for ends / : i.e. a particular species of human treats the conditions for its existence as conditions which ought to be imposed as a There's no value to anything independent of its being valued-by some living things or 36 TI.ix.5 says that life-denying morality 'is very dangerous, it is infectious, -it quickly grows in society's morbid soil'. 37 Hunt [1991] develops a related line: 'all moralities are fundamentally vitalistic in the intentions that lie behind them' . 38 Similarly for 'agreed that x is valued, but should it be valued?'.
other. So the question must instead suppose that whether x is valuable depends on some different valuing than this which values it. To apply this to Nietzsche's argument:
'agreed that power is valued in this deep way, but is it valuable?' asks why we should not instead privilege those viewpoints that do not value power, for example our moral principles. Nietzsche's answer is as above: those moral agent-values only matter to us because we deeply-but mistakenly-suppose they serve our power. When the antirealism reduces the question to a choice between these viewpoints, he thinks the decision will favor that underlying will.
3. Now given this sketched argument from biological life to values, let's look more closely at how these values get applied. Surprisingly, I think, Nietzsche draws two quite different kinds of lessons. The first is obvious from what we've just seen: we're to revalue our (agent-)values using the standard of will to power, taken as the essence of life. But there's a second way he makes values from life, which is probably even more prominent in his texts: we're to judge values by whether they 'say Yes to life', i.e. by whether they're life-affirming. This seems like a quite different point, and it may be puzzling to see how much weight Nietzsche puts on it. I want to examine these two points and give an account how they operate together. independent of the thesis that life is essentially will to power, since it seems one could 39 I treat this affirmation of life more thoroughly in 'Nietzsche's Value Monism'. 40 Re morality see also WP343 , and re Christianity WP1052 [1888] .
judge whether x affirms life, no matter what life might essentially be. But I think this independence vanishes as we look more closely.
Affirming (saying yes to) life is of course an attitude or perspective, but in Nietzsche's rich sense. It involves not just seeing or thinking, but also feeling, and most of all willing. Adequately affirming life must engage all these aspects, in an overall intending of life as good. It must view and 'think' life as good, but it must also feel it as good, i.e. take pleasure in it, as well as will it as good, i.e. pursue or promote it as an end.
So 'saying Yes' doesn't happen in a cold or contemplative judgment, but only when the person's full faculties are engaged-engaged positively towards life.
But this overall pro-attitude must be towards life: for Nietzsche it's crucial that one 'say Yes' to life as it actually is. It's not enough to announce oneself 'on the side of life'-as we've seen that can mean almost anything. If you're in favor of 'life', by which you mean the eternal life of Christianity, you're not really 'life-affirming' according to Nietzsche. One needs to be at least approximately right about what life is. And lifeaffirmation is fuller, to the extent one more adequately faces life as it is. Hence this point, to be applied, depends on a specification of 'how life is', and this can only be, for Nietzsche, the specification of it as will to power. Surely it is is as such that one must 'say Yes' to life, to do so in the fullest sense.
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Because affirming life involves both a) seeing it accurately, as it is, and b) effort on behalf of life, it is natural that this attitude should tend to be effective, i.e. actually promote or enhance life. Nietzsche, we may notice, tends to treat the life-affirming attitude as indeed furthering life, and the life-denying attitude as indeed harming it.
BGE259: 'as soon one wills to carry this principle [refraining mutually from injury, violence, and exploitation and placing one's will on a par with that of someone else]
further, even as basic principle of society, it immediately proves to be what it really is: a will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and decay.' 42 41 Notice how life affirmation involves insight in EH.iii.BT.2: 'This ultimate, most joyous, most abundantly playful Yes to life is not only the highest insight, it is also the deepest, the most strictly confirmed and supported by truth and science.' 42 EH.iv.7: 'This, the only morality that has been taught so far, the unselfing-morality, betrays a will to the end, it negates life in its lowest ground. . . . Definition of morality: morality -the idiosyncrasy of décadents, with the ulterior motive of revenging themselves on life -and successfully. I attach value to this definition. 2. But to see better how such personal and bodily life might have authority, we need to turn (again) to the criterion it supplies. This is of course power or growth, as A. 44 Or might Nietzsche suppose that all organisms have a rudimentary sense of themselves as living a life? They all will, after all, their growth/control, and might be sensitive too that some things will kill them. To be sure it's implausible to suppose them to 'look ahead' so as to see their living is bounded into a (finite) life. But we should bear in mind that they indeed are designed-by selection-to live through a life-cycle, and are sensitive, physiologically, to 'where they are' in this cycle (life). So there may be a rudimentary 'personal life' in simple organisms.
has shown. But our personal and bodily life supplies this criterion in a different way than there appeared. To be sure, I suggested that Nietzsche promotes this criterion because of its 'depth' in us, but I didn't develop how this depth reaches into our bodies, nor how the criterion comes to us from our bodies. We need to rethink how life 'supplies' this criterion.
We've supposed the criterion of power to have been extracted by philosophical argument from observation of life generally, via the claim that life's 'essential' aim at power is 'inescapably determining'-i.e. such that all values originate as means to it.
Life gives the criterion as an object of our study: we examine her, and ourselves, and infer that power has this ultimacy; we then deliberately review the ethics and practical rules we've accepted, and revise them in view of that clarified end.
But this is too cold-blooded to be Nietzsche's point (-there's not enough life in it). Life isn't passive object in his 'argument', but has a speaking role, and delivers her will to us more forcefully than via our study and inference. The way biological life is built into our bodies gives it a voice in them, and most of the trick will be to let it speak.
We get the criterion not so much by inferences taken from our bodies and applied in our deliberations, as by giving the body more place in our lives-and principle-driven deliberation less.
The biological (in the narrow sense) life built into my body speaks with special authority because it has its principal allegiance to the power of the organism I am. As but not in others, sometimes feeling the way to grow, to be more alive, but other times not. For most of us our deepest drives and aims are healthy, and track power. Indeed I think Nietzsche supposes that if one goes deep enough one will always find a healthy will, a will that does aim at power. This was one of the points we saw he meant by will to power's 'depth'-its ineliminability.
If there are enough such resources in the body, agency can help to realize themonce it learns (is trained) to set itself to that task. But to learn this is very hard, because it goes quite against the grain of agency's long-standing design. Our agency has a designed-in bias against the drives; its first instinct is to distrust and suppress them. This reconfiguration of the relation between our agency and our bodily drives is Nietzsche's response to the problem we've seen he was long obsessed with: the conflict between his will to truth, and his life or living. It is the adjustment that allows the will to truth, with its inherent asceticism, to function helpfully in the person. This will gives up the reins. It grants authority to the drives, but can do so willingly because it sees that even its own aim, truth-above all the truth about life-needs to be accomplished in these drives.
3. We can see the results of applying this criterion, so supplied, by returning to the idea of life-affirmation. We concluded above that this had little to contribute to Nietzsche's argument from life to values. But this was due to our focus on agent-values:
we presumed that the argument meant to change our principles. I think the idea of lifeaffirmation works in that other, personal and bodily side to Nietzsche's thought; this is why it's needed as complement to the arguments about will to power. Filling out this life-affirmation brings us to the bottom of his points.
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Even though the lesson 'say Yes to life' relies on and runs into the lesson to agentvalue power, it includes an emotive or affective aspect not present in agent-valuing-and also not present in the agent-principle to maximize power. I suggest this is the key reason Nietzsche so often puts the point this way. Saying Yes to life is a matter not just of a positive judgment, but of (something much like) loving it. It shows that the lesson must be learned in a personal and bodily way.
It is to stress the engagement with personal life that Nietzsche so often describes the revaluative process in his own case-as he has managed it in the living of his own life. 48 This personalizing of his ideas of course culminates in Ecce Homo, which presents the new ideal as it is found and embraced within an individual life. The point of this personalizing is not to relativize the ideal to Nietzsche himself, but to display how the 47 Here I agree with Reginster [2006, 228] : 'We truly "understand" him only when we understand what the affirmation of life amounts to.' 48 Conway [2006, 539] : 'most of his specific references to self-overcoming pertain to the developmental trajectory of his own life'.
Zarathustra's embrace of eternal return, the ultimate saying-Yes to life, takes place only in confrontation with the existential structure of his own life: it's this life whose return he affirms. 51 And he only accomplishes this embrace by a struggle fought in his body, and suffered physiologically, as described in iii.13 ('The Convalescent').
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So Nietzsche's test for life-affirmation-whether one can will this return-needs to be met with regard to one's personal life, and at the level of one's body-values.
Although Zarathustra makes the point about life 'just' metaphorically, it locates the point where Nietzsche felt it most strongly. The personification of Life as the object of sexual love stresses both the existential-personal sense of life, and the need to respond to it in one's bodily taste and feeling. It expresses the emotive relation to one's living that Nietzsche principally advocates. We can't simply apply these lessons about life's ends to our values 'from outside': we need to uncover and activate these life-ends in ourselves (in our bodies), and arrange a cooperation between them and our agential valuing. We saw how the claim that 'life is will to power' seems to make the argument depend on a quasi-metaphysical claim about all biological life. But the weight of Nietzsche's point runs at a more personal level: biological life is important not so much for its generality as for its depth in each of us. Biological life is represented in our bodies, by our drives, which ultimately aim us at power. Such life (aiming at power) has authority, as criterion for judging values, because of this bodily presence in each of us. It is the undermost valuing in us, aimed at our individual good, which is growth. 51 The focus is also on personal life in GS341: 'What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you in your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it . . . "'. 52 '[H]e collapsed like a dead man and lay for a long time like one dead. But when he came to himself again, he was pale and trembling and remained lying down, and for a long time he wanted neither food nor drink.' [iii.13] Nietzsche thought of himself as having undergone a decisive illness and then convalescence in his 'middle', positivist period.
tame and herd us (turn us into good citizens). It pretends to be our freedom, the better to so socialize us. We should revalue these agent-values by diagnosing this hidden design.
But the point of this revaluation is not just to change the content of our agent-values, but to change the role of agency in us-its own relation to body-values. This is the role of the poetic personification of Life in Zarathustra, and its insertion in a sexual drama.
